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Competing Visions:

Political Formation of Korean Americans
in Los Angeles, 1992-1997’
Edward J.W. Park
On April 25, 1997, the Korean Youth and Community Center,
the Korean Immigrant Workers Advocates, and the UCLA
Asian American Studies Center hosted the first National Korean
American Studies Conference to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the Los Angeles Civil Unrest of 1992.2 In the keynote
address, K.W. Lee, one of the pioneers of the Korean American
community and a long time civil rights activist who has spent his
life’s work documenting racial inequality in America, gave an
impassioned speech regarding the significance of the Civil Unrest on the Korean American community. With a steady voice
that spoke of his utter conviction, K.W. Lee drew parallels between the Civil Unrest and the JapaneseAmerican Internment half
a century ago. K.W. Lee argued that the Civil Unrest, like the
Japanese American Internment, represented a clear case of racial
victimization. Moreover, he argued that, like the JapaneseAmerican Internment, the Civil Unrest ought to unleash the will to political empowerment for a new generation of Korean Americans who
would seek to find redress for the past injustices and to make
sure that the same victimization would not occur.
K.W. Lee’s claim that Korean Americans were victims of racial injustice and that the Civil Unrest should serve as a political
wake-up call to the Korean American community was remarkably
similar, in some respects, to the speech given by the arch-conservative Congressman Jay Kim (R-Diamond Bar) two years before? In a forum provided by Radio Korea to commemorate the
third anniversary of the Civil Unrest, Jay Kim made a similar
impassioned speech regarding its significance. Coming at the heel
of one of his greatest political victories-the passage of California’s
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notorious Proposition 187 that denied undocumented immigrants
public education, welfare, and health programs-Jay Kim made
comparisons between the Civil Unrest and the Jewish experience in Europe during the 1930s. Jay Kim argued that Korean
Americans like the Jews experienced nothing less than an urban
pogrom at the hand of those who were driven by racial envy
and bent on ethnic vengeance. He then pointed to the Jewish resolve after World War I1 to politically empower themselves to ensure that their victimization would not happen again.
Given the political and ideological differences between the
progressive K.W. Lee and the conservative Jay Kim, it is perhaps
ironic that they chose similar analogies for analyzing the significance of the Civil Unrest for the Korean American community.
However, in my view, both speakers underscored two key concerns in the political formation of Korean Americans: “Who victimized us?”, and ”How do we politically empower ourselves?”
The purpose of this article is to describe how the political developments in the Korean American community since 1992 has
sought to answer these two fundamental questions. The conflicting ways in which these questions have been answered not
only provide critical insights into the political formation of Korean Americans but also shed light on the nature of racial politics, immigrant political incorporation, and Asian American
politics.
The Los Angeles Civil Unrest of 1992 marked an important turning point for both U.S. race relations and Korean American political formation. In the same year Andrew Hacker declared that
Asian Americans and Latinos were merely ”spectators” to U.S.
racial politics,4 the Los Angeles Civil Unrest thrust Asian Americans and Latinos to the center of U.S. racial consciousness and
politics. Since 1992, the centrality of Asian Americans and Latinos
in U.S. racial politics has only deepened: from California’s Proposition 187 to national welfare reform, Asian Americans and Latinos
have become central preoccupations for ambitious politicians
and angry voters. While state- and federal-level policies have
placed immigrants under legislative attack, inter-minority conflicts between Latinos, Asian Americans, and African Americans
have generated racial tensions in many U.S. cities.
As the Los Angeles Civil Unrest has forced U.S. society to
confront its multiracial realities, the event has also caused Korean
Americans to collectively struggle for political integration and
empowerment. Motivated by a sense that the community’s economic damage and human costs resulted from its political exclusion, Korean Americans have begun the difficult process of

institution-building and political activi~m.~
While their national
political formation has begun to take shape with the foundhg of
some key organizations, their efforts have taken the most concrete
shape in Los Angeles6
This article will examine the political formation of Korean
Americans in Los Angeles since the Civil Unrest. In their formation, Korean Americans reveal a great deal about the internal organization of their community and the diverse forces that shape
the community’s political agenda. Even in their initial engagement, Korean Americans in Los Angeles provide important
clues and insights to how new groups to U.S. politics will negotiate their inclusion and redefine American politics.
This study is based on the growing literature on the postCivil Unrest Los Angeles and Korean American politics. Since
1992, academics and journalists alike have taken a renewed interest in Los Angeles, the Korean American community, and the
politics of race. This literature is supplemented with forty-five
in-depth interviews conducted in the summer of 1996 by the author. The interviewees represent a diverse group of Korean Americans with various political perspectives and social backgrounds.
The majority of them were members of political and community
organizations that were actively engaged in the political process.
Their social backgrounds cut across class and gender lines as well
as immigration and generation status. In addition to officers and
members of political and social service organizations, interviewees
included merchants, workers, students, and religious leaders.
Civil Unrest and the Transformation
of Korean American Politics

The Civil Unrest has had a transformative effect on Korean
Americans. Along with unprecedented devastating economic
and human loss, the Civil Unrest and the ensuing politics of rebuilding brought the first major political crisis to the Korean
American c o m m ~ n i t yAs
. ~ a political crisis, the Civil Unrest has
generated two different, but ultimately interrelated, changes in
the Korean American community leadership. The first change
occurred at the level of political legitimacy of community leadership, brought on by the discourse surrounding the Civil Unrest and, more concretely, the politics of rebuilding. The second
change has been the increasing division among the emerging
political leadership, and for the first time within the Korean
American community, a prominent injection of openly partisan
politics. These changes have transformed Korean American politics and have set the stage for future political development.
The political discourse surrounding Korean Americans and
their strained relationship with African Americans was a major
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contributing factor to the events of April 29, 1992.8 At the center of
this discourse was the utilization of the Soon Ja Du Incident of
1991 as the central metaphor for a decade of Black-Korean tensions in the inner-~ity.~
Many observers-from journalists and
academics to elected politicians and persons on the street-cited
the Soon Ja Du Incident as a major factor that not only led to the
Civil Unrest, but, in some cases, justified the inordinate economic loss suffered by Korean Americans.lo Particularly within
the mass media, the Soon Ja Du Incident was invoked in a casual
and reckless way, with some outlets replaying the video footage
of the actual shooting as they showed the live footage of burning Korean American stores. Indeed, KPFK, the Los Angeles radio affiliate of the Public Broadcasting System and one of the
few progressive media outlets in the city, celebrated the looting
of Korean American stores as a ”pay back.””
From the Korean American perspective, the invoking of the
Soon Ja Du Incident and the Black-Korean tension to explain
both the cause of Sa-I-Gu and the ethnic pattern of looting was
seen as a case of scapegoating Korean Americans.l* Many Korean Americans felt ”re-victimized”by this discourse.13 A Korean
American student at UCLA recalls being told by a number of
non-Korean American students, ”Korean Americans got what
they deserved,” linking the Soon Ja Du Incident with the Civil
Unrest. K.W. Lee, a long-time journalist and observer of the Korean American community, argued that ”this scapegoating was
the real victimization that Korean Americans were made to suffer.
We were told in a backhanded way that we were to blame for
the riots and that we should rightly bear the burden.”14
As frustration and anger within the community grew, the
existing political establishment within the community-represented most powerfully by the Korean Federation whose political legitimacy came with its close identification with the South
Korean government-could not defend the community. Bound
by language barriers and lack of institutional ties, the Korean
Federation vented its frustration within the confines of the Korean American media, with little impact on the mainstream discourse. Members of the Korean Federation also charged local African American politicians for turning their backs on the Korean
American community even though they had received financial
support for their political campaigns from various Korean American organizations, including the Korean Federation. However,
their bitter charges only underscored the failure on their part to
influence the mainstream political system. A Korean American
volunteer at a senior citizen center stated:
44

I lost all respect I had for the Korean Federation. They have always claimed that they were the leaders of the community, even

calling the President the "Mayor of Koreatown." But during the
riot, our mayor could not even come on the television and tell
the rest of America that Korean Americans should not be blamed
for the riots and that our suffering is as real as anyone e1~e's.l~
While Korean Americans were frustrated and angered by
what they perceived to be an effort to blame them for the Civil
Unrest, the-politics of rebuilding further demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the existing Korean American community political power structure. In the aftermath of the Civil Unrest, Korean
Americans had little or no representation in the official rebuilding efforts. In the creation of "Rebuild Los Angeles" (RLA), the
sole official response to the Civil Unrest from the city hall, Korean
Americans were notably absent from the leadership. Even after
RLA's leadership was diversified with the creation of four cochairs, the "Asian co-chair" went to Linda Wong, a Chinese American.16 In addition, as both of the Presidential candidates-George
Bush and Bill Clinton-made their tours of Los Angeles in the
midst of election year politicking, Korean Americans were notably absent in their entourage as locally elected officials took the
spotlight and articulated the rebuilding agenda.17 The Korean
community, confronted with unprecedented crisis, keenly felt
their marginality in the politics of rebuilding. A first-generation
Executive Director of a community food distribution center recalled:
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When these rebuilding efforts were going on, it really showed
the shortcomingsof the established Korean American leadership
right after the riots. We didn't have anyone who had the ability to work effectively with people outside the Korean American community. I'm a good example. During Sa-I-Gu, I was
an assistant minister at one of the largest Korean American
churches in Korea-town, and I once served as an officer in Korean Federation. But, even though I lived in the U.S. for 15years,
I can't speak enough English, let alone speak English with lawyers and government bureaucrats. So, people like us stood by
and hoped for new leaders to come in.ls
Literally overnight on the May 6, 1992 broadcast of ABC's
"Nightline," the Korean American community found a new leader
in Angela Oh.'9 A second-generation Korean American criminal
defense lawyer who had been active in liberal circles in Los Angeles politics but an unknown within the Korean American
community, Oh finally articulated a Korean American perspective on the Civil Unrest. With enormous poise, she protested the
media's coverage of Korean Americans as dehumanized gun-toting vigilantes and faulted the media for failing to discuss the decades of neglect of the inner-cities that created the conditions for
the Civil Unrest. While her appearance on "Nightline" did little to
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reshape the discourse on the Civil Unrest, her entry into the debate nonetheless marked an important turning point in Korean
American politics: for the first time in the community’s short history, a spokespersonemerged whose political ties lay outside of the
entrenched community power structure. And, by winning the
support of Korean Americans who saw in her an articulate spokesperson who could advocate on the mainstream media on behalf
of the community, Oh created a space for others to fill the political vacuum?O Oh was quickly joined by other Korean Americans
such as Marcia Choo and Ryan Song who spoke for the first time
as representatives of the community.
The politics of rebuilding also fueled the rise of a new generation of Korean American leaders. As others have shown, the
politics of rebuilding unfolded through new institutions that
placed a premium on interracial and interethnic collaboration.21
RLA, with its four Anglo, Latino, African American, and Asian
American co-chairs, reflected racial consolidation as a key strategy from the city hall to facilitate the rebuilding effort. At the
same time, the major rebuilding efforts outside of the city hall
also placed a premium on racial and ethnic consolidation to exercise greater leverage on mainstream political institutions.22
New organizations which provided much of the ”unofficial”political leadership in the rebuilding effort such as Multicultural Collaborative (MCC-an organization that brought together social
service agencies from all major racial groups), Asian Pacific
Americans for a New Los Angeles (APANJA),and the Asian Pacific Planning Council (APMJON) demanded interracial and interethnic coalition building for participating in the rebuilding process.
Individuals including Bong Hwan Kim (Executive Director of the
Korean Youth and Community Center [KYCC]) and Roy Hong
(Executive Director of Korean Immigrant Workers Advocates
[KIWAI-a progressive labor organization) became key Korean
American figures in the rebuilding effort and became new political figures within the Korean American c o r n r n ~ n i t y . ~ ~
With a benefit of six-year hindsight, it is clear that the shift
in the Korean American political leadership has occurred along
two dimensions. Most visibly, the shift represents a generational change whereby many of the immigrant-generation leaders stepped aside as second-generation and the so-called 1.5generation (those who immigrated to the U.S. as young children)
emerged as key political leaders. The political ascendancy of Angela Oh, Bong Hwan Kim, Roy Hong, Cindy Choi (co-chair of
MCC), and Michelle Park-Steel (Republican activist and a key
figure in the Korean American Coalition’s Youth Leadership
Conference) represents this generational shift within the Korean
American political l e a d e r ~ h i p .A~ ~
concurrent, less visible transi-

tion saw the decline of those whose political base was rooted in
”homeland” politics and the rise of others (first-generation included) who had political ties with mainstream political institutions. These included CongressmanJay Kim (R-Diamond Bar) and
Tong So0 Chung (a Democrat activist and a C h t o n appointee to
the Department of Commerce), first-generation Korean Americans who leveraged their careers to unprecedented levels for Korean Americans. As an unequivocal sign of concession to the
changing political realities within the Korean American community, Korean Federation changed their main organizational mission from “representing the collective interest of Koreans living
in the U.S.” to “supporting the effort of Korean Americans for
political repre~entation.”~~
Community Divided
While Korean Americans in Los Angeles agree on the necessity
to participate in mainstream politics, they have been divided over
how to best channel their political resources and energies. At
the center of this division lies the explicit partisan politics that
have emerged within the community. This partisanship division
reflects both the change in the community’s leadership and developments facing the community since the Civil Unrest. New leaders had clear party loyalties. Liberals such as Angela Oh and Bong
Hwan Kim were clearly identified with the Democratic Party,
while conservatives such as Jay Kim and Michelle Park-Steel
brought with them institutional ties to the Republican Party. In
this way, a central component of shift in the community’s political leadership was the introduction of explicit partisan politics
within the Korean American community.
As Korean Americans embark on their road to political empowerment, Korean American liberals have argued that the community ought to align themselves with the traditional Civil Rights
Coalition within the Democratic Party.26 In particular, they argue that Korean Americans are victims of racial oppression in
America who have been excluded from the mainstream economy
and from equal protection under the law. At the same time, they
also argue that whatever rights and equality Korean Americans
currently enjoy have originated largely from the Civil Rights
struggles of the African Americans and Latinos, including the
passage of Hart-Celler’s Act (1965) which finally removed racial
barriers to immigration. From this vantage point of racial oppression and historical linkages with other racial minority
groups, Korean American liberals argued that the Civil Unrest
of 1992 was a culmination of racial injustice in America where
decades of inner-city neglect and racial oppression resulted in
the explosion that victimized all communities of color. Liberals
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believed that the best hope for Korean Americans in their effort
to find lasting political empowerment is to join other communities of color and white liberals who are committed issues of racia1 equality and justice. In practical terms, this vision of Korean
American political incorporation urged the community to join
the Democratic Party and its established structure of racial minority incorporation.
This vision of political incorporation emerged within the
Korean American community immediately after the Civil Unrest.
Angela Oh became one of the first openly liberal political leaders within the community by linking the Civil Unrest with the
Republican neglect of the inner-cities and racial inequality on
the part of mainstream political institutions, including the criminal justice system.27 In the massive "Peace Rally" organized by
Korean Americans and attended by 30,000 participants on May
11,1992, placards such as "Justice for Rodney King," "Justice for
All People of Color," and "More Jobs for the Inner-City" implicated institutional racism and economic inequality as primary
causes of the Civil Unrest. Moreover, these messages reflected a
sense of common victimization and destiny that Korean Americans
felt with the African American and Latino communities.
A Korean American woman labor activist who participated
in the March commented:
There was a definite racial tone to the March. Korean Americans were angry at the white power structure, even more than at
those who took part in the looting. The Koreans felt that they
paid the cost of a racist justice system and years of inner-city
neglect. More than that, they felt that the white power structure sacrificed Koreatown to take the full brunt of people's anger. Only when the looting spread to places like Hollywood or
the Westside did Daryl Gates and Pete Wilson send in the troops
to quell the looting. Many Koreans marching through the heart of
the heavily Latino and African American Koreatown were yelling
"Join us! We want racial justice just like you." And, many Latinos
and African Americans did just that.28
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Another Korean American woman who works as a secondary
school teacher states, "I thought Korean Americans would use the
March to show our anger at the looters and the March would be
a display of our narrow nationalism. However, I was completely
wrong. The March was really about Koreans reaching out to other
groups, especially to African American and Latino communities."
Along with this sense of common victimization, the political
protest in the Peace March took on a partisan tone. Among the
marchers, a woman held up a large red sign that read "Is This a
Kinder, Gentler Nation?" in reference to President Bush's 1988
campaign while another woman held up a sign that read "Wil-

son-You Were Three Days Too Late” in reference to Governor
Wilson‘s decision to send in the national guard on May 2, three
days after much of South Central Los Angeles and Koreatown
laid in ruins. For many Korean Americans, the timing of the Civil
Unrest, coming after over a decade of Republican control of both
the White House and the Governor’s Mansion, reflected squarely
on Republican leadership and their policies of fiscal austerity and
political hostility toward the inner-cities. A middle-age Korean
American man who is member of the Board of Directors of
KIWA stated:
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I was surprised by the political insights of so many Korean
Americans. They felt that the American government systematically ignored the plight of poor in the inner-city and abused
racial minorities. Especially in the Peace March, there was no
difference between what Koreans were saying and what the
African Americans and Latinos were saying. ”We want justice
for Rodney King, we want jobs in the inner-cities, we want racial equality, and we want you to stop abusing our communities.” Old-time liberals like us who felt we were a small minority in the community was really quite stunned with what we
sawZ9

Within the Korean American community, the Korean American Democratic Committee (KADC) has become a platform for
liberals and progressives to organize their political activities.
Founded in 1992, KADC’s had difficulties for much of its existence as most visible liberals and progressives channeled their
political activities in coalition efforts. Leaders such as Angela
Oh and Bong Hwan Kim played key roles in the formation of
MCC and APANLA and did not actively provide leadership in
Korean American partisan politics.3o In addition, KIWA, perhaps
the most progressive organization in the community, spent most
of the intervening years in a bitter fight with the Korean American Relief Fund in a struggle to win Korean American and Latino
workers a share of the relief money that flowed into the community after the Civil Unrest?l However, with the Presidential
campaign in full swing and the prospect of bitter partisan fights
over issues of affirmative action in state politics (California’s
Proposition 209) and immigration and welfare reform in national
politics, KADC was revitalized in the summer of 1996with Angela
Oh, Bong Hwan Kim, and K.S. Park (an organizer at KIWA) joining KADC as officers. In its revitalization, KADC launched an
ambitious program to politically organize Korean Americans for
the 1996 election, including launching a voter-registration drive,
compiling a voter’s guide (a first time for the community in a
non-primary election), and coordinating a voter-education drive
through the Korean American ethnic media.
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Despite their recent entry into the mainstream Los Angeles
politics, Korean American liberals have already impacted Los
Angeles coalition politics. Both Angela Oh and Bong Hwan Kim
have played an instrumental role in the formation of MCC and
APANLA, with Cindy Choi becoming one of the founding co-directors of MCC.32 As Regalado has pointed out, MCC represents
one of the more progressive voices within Los Angeles p0litics.3~
Through this engagement, Korean Americans have become visible
politically with the hiring of K. Connie Kang-a Korean American journalist-by the Los Angeles Times and the securing of T.S.
Chung to the Department of Commerce. In addition, KIWA has
engaged in a number of highly visible labor conflicts where they
have worked with predominantly Latino rank-and-file labor
unions. With KIWA’s alliance, unions such as Justice for Janitors and HERE Local 11were able to resolve labor conflicts that
involved Latino workers and Korean or Korean American employers without having these conflicts grow into racial conflicts,
pointing a way to multiracial organizing and cooperation.% Similarly, Korean Youth and Community Center’s cooperation with the
Community Coalition for Substance Abuse Prevention and Training (a predominantly African American anti-substance abuse organization headed by Karen Bass) to convert Korean American liquor stores damaged during the Civil Unrest to other types of
businesses received a great deal of media coverage for representing a new possibility in Black-Korean relations.ll In a short
period of time, Korean American liberals have brought a new
set of issues to the city’s political agenda.
While liberals urged Korean Americans to join other communities of color through the Civil Rights Coalition within the
Democratic Party, conservative Korean American activists have
urged the Korean American community to align itself with the
conservative politics of the Republican Party. Whereas liberals
cite racial injustice and inner-city neglect as the cause of Civil Unrest, Korean American conservatives have argued that the root of
the Civil Unrest can be found in the failure of the liberal welfare
state and the Civil Rights Coalition. Moreover, they argued that
the Korean American community, with its large segment of small
entrepreneurs and accelerating residential sub-urbanization,could
best pursue their political interests through the Republican Party
that has championed fiscal conservatism and law and order.36
While appealing to material interests of Korean Americans, they
also pointed out the recent changes within the Republican Party
itself. More specifically, they cited the rise of racial minorities
such as Colin Powell, Ward Connerly (anAfrican American member of the University of California Regents and a key architect of
undermining the state’s affirmative action programs), Jay Kim,

and Wendy Gramm (a Korean American appointee to the Department of Commerce under Bush and the wife of Senator and Presidential Candidate Phil Gramm) within the Party as evidence
that the Party was now inclusive of racial minorities and ”legal”
immigrants. While Korean American liberals pointed to the Civil
Rights Coalition and the Democratic Party for removing past
discriminatory policies, Korean American conservativespointed to
the symmetry of the Republican political agenda and the material interests of the Korean American community and the new
politics of inclusion within the Republican Party.
If the Peace March represented a high point in the Korean
American community’s public display of liberal sentiments, the
politics surrounding the rebuilding of the liquor stores showed
the barriers between the Korean American community and the
Civil Rights Coalition and created an opportunity for conservatives to make their appeal to the Korean American community.
Well before the Civil Unrest, liquor stores in the inner-cities were a
major source of tension between African American and Korean
American communitie~?~
African Americans charged that liquor
stores saturated inner-city communities and served as magnets
for criminal activities ranging from drug dealing to prostitution,
while Korean Americans cited their basic right to engage in a legal commercial activity.36 The Civil Unrest provided an unexpected opportunity to settle this impasse between the two communities when 200 liquor stores were de~troyed.3~
The racial dimension to the rebuilding of the liquor stores became apparent
when it was found that 175 of the 200 liquor stores were owned
by Korean Americans and local African American politicians
were seizing this opportunity to severely curtail the number of
liquor stores.38 While local African American politicians saw
this as an opportunity to show their accountability to their largely
African American and Latino constituency, Korean American
conservatives saw this as an opportunity to rally the community
toward the Republican Party and reframe the Civil Unrest and
its aftermath from a conservative p e r s ~ e c t i v e . ~ ~
Working with white and Latino liberals in the Los Angeles
City Council, local African American political leaders, headed
by city council members Mark Ridley-Thomas, Rita Walters, and
state assembly member Marguerite Archie-Hudson, launched
“The Campaign to Rebuild South Central Without Liquor Stores”
and successfully imposed a conditional use variance process that
would allow the city hall, in consultation with local residents, to
impose conditions for rebuilding the liquor stores such as restricting hours of operation and requiring uniformed security guards.
The Korean American Grocers Association (KAGRO),representing
the Korean American liquor store owners, sought to bypass the
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city hall altogether by going directly to the California legislature
where they worked with Paul Horcher, then a conservative Republican from East San Gabriel Valley. In consultation with
KAGRO and the newly established Korean American Republican Association (KARA), Horcher sponsored AB 1974 in the
state legislature that would have removed the conditional variance process in Los Angeles. Ultimately, AB 1974 was defeated
in the committee by a coalition of Democrats with strong objection from Republicans. Two years later, only ten of the 175 Korean American-owned liquor stores were back in b~siness.~’
While Korean American conservatives clearly lost the policy
battle, the politics surrounding the liquor stores became a major
victory for the newly emergent Korean American conservative activists. First, the liquor store controversy allowed many Korean
American conservatives to gain political visibility within the Korean American community for the first time. New figures such
as Michelle Park-Steel, whose political ties with the Republican
Party ran deep as the wife of Republican Party activist Shawn
Steel, and Jerry Yu, who placed his legal career on hold to advocate full-time for KAGRO, represent conservative activists who
became highly visible in the Korean American community through
the liquor store controversy. Much like their liberal counterparts, they gained their political legitimacy by demonstrating to
the community that they could make an impact on mainstream
politics and move mainstream political institutions on behalf of
the Korean American community. Second, Korean American conservatives were able to use the liquor store controversy to sharpen
the political differences between the Korean American and African American communities and undermine the liberal’s vision
of rallying Korean Americans quickly and easily into the Civil
Rights Coalition. In their defeat over the liquor store controversy,
Korean American conservatives pulled no punches as they blamed
the African American community for depriving Korean Americans of their economic rights. In an editorial published in the
Korea Times, Michelle Park-Steel and Shawn Steel urged Korean
Americans to use the liquor store controversy to ”carefully assess
who are their friends and who are their enemies” as they charged
African American politicians for “unleashing a legislative terror.’’42Jerry Yu linked the issue of liquor store controversy to the
more fundamental failing of the Civil Rights Coalition and the
Democratic Party. In an interview with The Korea Times,he claimed
that ”these African American politicians” are blaming the Korean
Americans for “decades of their own failed policies in the innercities that caused the riots in the first place.”43
A Korean American student whose family store was burned
down during the Civil Unrest and remains closed after four

years stated:
My family’s American Dream died when the city prevented us
from rebuilding our store. We were victimized by the racism of
the black community who want us out of South Central. Never
mind that we have the right to conduct business and make a
living. We are the wrong skin color from their point of view,
and we don’t belong in their community. However, last time
I checked, there were no signs that read “You Are Now Entering
the Black Community”at the borders of South Central. If whites
did this to Blacks, then this would be a huge incident. But, I
guess Black racism against Koreans is okay.&

A member of KARA argued that “the liquor store issue really
stopped the rise of liberals like Angela Oh and Bong Hwan Kim.
The liquor store issue made [Oh and Kim’s] claim that Korean
Americans must join Blacks and Latinos to fight white racism
seem simple and idealistic,” pointing out that “it was clear to all
Korean Americans that it was the white Republicans who fought
for our community and it was the blacks who wanted nothing
less than to drive us
Another KARA member observes that
“the liquor store controversy refreshed the memories of Koreans
of the real problem of inner-cities-African American and Democratic politicians would rather go after some bogeyman such as
white racism or evil Koreans rather than telling people they have to
work hard, get off welfare, and rebuild the economy.”46
While KADC has begun to organize the Korean American
community with an explicit partisan label, KARA has become
one of the most visible political forces in the Korean American
community since the Civil Unrest. Its major political victory came
only months after the Civil Unrest with the election of Jay Kim
to the House of Representatives in November, 1992. As the very
first Korean American to be elected to a federal office, Kim brought
immediate legitimacy to KARA and energized Korean American
conservatives. In his four years as Congressman, Kim has aggressively pursued his ultra-conservative agenda, refusing to
join the Democratic-dominated Asian American Caucus in the
House and becoming a co-sponsor of California’s politicallycharged Proposition 187 that sought to deny government benefits to undocumented immigrant^.^^ In 1995, KARA stepped
up their activities to the Presidential level when it successfully
hosted a fund-raising dinner for Phil Gramm’s Presidential campaign and, in 1996, co-hosted Bob Dole’s victory speech in California’s primaries in Orange County. Finally, Mark Kim, a Korean
American Assistant Deputy in the Los Angeles District Attorney’s
Office and the president of KARA, took a leadership role within
the Korean American community in advocating California’s
Proposition 209 which would preempt affirmative action policies
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in state government agencies, including public employment and
government contracting. In their entry, Korean American conservatives have joined other conservative racial minorities to
bring new legitimacy to the Republican Party’s claim for racial
inclusion-a central theme in the Republican Party’s National
Convention in 1996-and brought new complexities to racial
politics surrounding affirmative action and immigration reform.48
Conclusion
The Civil Unrest of 1992 marked a fundamental shift in Korean
American political formation, resulting in the efforts to find empowerment through a committment to mainstream political process. New leaders must participate and work in multiracial and
multiethnic settings. Korean Americans, however, remain profoundly divided along partisan lines. At the center of this division lies conflicting “racial visions” of where Korean Americans
fit into America’s racial landscape as well as conflicting assessments over the Civil Rights Coalition. Liberals have argued that
Korean Americans are an oppressed racial minority group and
their rights and interests can be best protected by joining the
Civil Rights Coalition and the Democratic Party. In contrast,
conservatives have insisted that Korean Americans have fundamental economic and political differences with key members of
the Civil Rights Coalition and that Korean Americans can better
meet their interests through the Republican Party and its committment toward fiscal conservatism, law and order, and the
dismantling of the welfare state. The emergence of KADC and
KARA has given a well-defined institutional base to the community’s partisan politics at the very inception of Korean American
political formation. Clearly, it is too early to tell which one of
these partisan efforts will succeed in leaving a lasting impact on
Korean American political formation. As the Korean American
community has become transformed in its search for political
empowerment, the inclusion of Korean Americans and other
new immigrant groups have posed new challenges for the mainstream political system and its more established participants.
As the Democratic Party attempts to revise the traditional Civil
Rights Coalition to include Korean Americans, the Republican
Party seeks to reinvent itself as an inclusive Party in the face of
America’s changing demography. As the massive entry of African Americans into the mainstream political system transformed
the American political system during the post-World War I1 era,
the entry of Korean Americans into the American political system will lead to yet other transformations.
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Marching in the Loyalty Parade. Post members participate in a Loyalty Day
parade in Oakland’s Chinatown, about 1970. Though mostly World War I I
veterans in this photo, there is a Vietnam veteran carrying the American flag.
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